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ABSTRACT
Robert Sharf argues that if a religious or mystical experience conveys any meaning at all, that
meaning derives from shared public discourse, not from the experience as such. Sharf’s
argument is, or should be, unsettling for anyone who naively thinks that religious beliefs are
grounded in religious experiences. In this paper I examine Sharf’s arguments and suggest
another way of approaching the notion of mystical or religious experience within the study of
religions. Distinguishing between mystical experience and mystical teachings can help to
explain how ‘experience’ can retain a meaningful place in mysticism.
INTRODUCTION
In his essay on ‘Experience’,<1> Robert Sharf argues that if a religious or mystical experience
<2> conveys any meaning at all, then that meaning derives from shared public discourse;
from ‘the contested realm of public meanings’,<3> not from an ‘experience’ as such. Sharf’s
argument is a powerful one, and unsettling for students and scholars of religion who think that
(at least some) religious teachings are (somehow) grounded in religious experiences. In this
paper I examine Sharf’s arguments and suggest another way of looking at the notion of
religious or mystical experience, one which takes into account his critique.
Sharf’s chapter on ‘Experience’ was written for a volume of essays called ‘Critical Terms for
Religious Studies’. The ‘Experience’ essay itself derives from an earlier, lengthier article Sharf
published in ‘Numen’ which drew more explicitly on his fieldwork-based research into modern
Asian Buddhism.<4> In my own experience, relatively few students – or indeed scholars – of
religion are familiar with the argument in Sharf’s essay, possibly because mystical experience is
not the hot theoretical topic it once was; one colleague recently joked to me that a better
spelling of Mysticism would be ‘Mistycism’, reflecting a general scepticism about rational efforts
to clarify such a topic.<5> Yet the term ‘experience’ has probably never been more pervasive
in discussions of religion, presumably as a consequence of the ‘turn to the self’ characteristic of
postmodernity. Interest in ‘experience’, however, has moved away from the paradigm of a
pure, disembodied mystical experience to other and earthier notions of cultural experience and
the power relations involved in these categories: experience as embodied, gendered, ethnic,
near-death, past-life, queer, cyber-, and so forth.<6>
Academics who are interested in mystical experience in the more traditional sense of an
unmediated revelatory state of consciousness are familiar with somewhat tired debates about a
‘common core’ of mysticism and the positions on either side of this debate. Scholars of
mysticism are also well aware that narratives of mystical experience are invariably culturally
constructed (Mexican Catholics see the Blessed Virgin Mary and speak about it in Spanish,
Tibetan Buddhists see Chenrezig and describe the vision in Tibetan, etc.),<7> and that
narratives about experiences are narratives, not the ‘original’ experience. Moreover, it is
common knowledge that what is meant by ‘mysticism’ changes over time. A recent insightful
survey of ‘Mysticism and Spirituality’ by Richard King<8> summarises these debates and
points to the modern trend to ‘privatisation’ and ‘psychologisation’ of religion in which, as King
puts it, ‘ineffability in the modern study of mysticism and spirituality has become a question of
the indescribable nature of intense and private experiences rather than a reflection of the
traditional exploration of the transcendental majesty of God or the ultimate reality’.<9>
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However, Sharf raises even more fundamental questions about the very notion of ‘experience’,
such as whether mystical or religious experiences really do occur apart from their expression,
whether such experiences are at some level sui generis (i.e. special to religion and resistant to
a deconstructive or reductive analysis) and whether such experiences are therefore peculiarly
suited to study by specialists in religion.
Sharf’s article should, in my view, be recognised as an important contribution to debate on
theory and method in the study of religion, for it is not just a study of notions of mystical or
religious experience but a challenge to the very foundational myth of the modern study of
religions. As we shall see below, Sharf asks: if religious experience does not exist as an object
of study, what justifies the existence of the study of religions as a distinctive discipline? In
writings on religion the term ‘experience’ is still widely used, and often unreflectively used.
<10> Even if we resist Sharf’s conclusion that the concept of experience has no future as an
analytical category in the study of religions, reading Sharf should at least cause us to pause
when we are next tempted to use the word ‘experience’ in a sentence about religion, mysticism
or spirituality.
Among those of my acquaintance who have actually read Sharf’s essay, most react somewhat
negatively towards both Sharf’s arguments and his conclusions<11> However, it is
considerably easier to disagree with Sharf than to argue cogently against him. And why would
one want to do either? There are many theorists of religion, committed to a view of religion as
an entirely public, culturally and politically embedded human phenomenon, potentially fully
explicable through the methods of the social, human and cognitive sciences, who would happily
endorse Sharf’s central conclusion that all attempts to signify ‘inner experience’ are destined to
remain “well-meaning squirms that get us nowhere” (a phrase of Samuel Beckett).<12> Such
theorists would see no need to restate - since Sharf has presented them so well - the
arguments which lead to that conclusion, still less to consider counter-arguments which might
bring a sui generis notion of religious experience, of the kind espoused by William James or
Rudolf Otto, back into the academic conversation about religions.<13>
However, not all scholars take the view that religion, including religious experience, is
explicable in purely human or materialistic terms; that it can, as it were, be explained away.
Whether the wellspring of constantly-emerging human religiosity is construed as neural
activity, the unconscious, cosmic energy, a higher power, Nature, God(dess), inherent
enlightenment or (no-)self, many scholars who wish to preserve the dignity of religious voices
in their academic work would be unwilling to concede that narratives of religious experience
are merely ‘squirms that get us nowhere’. The phrase is, after all, demeaning. To date,
however, I have seen no convincing alternative argument about religious experience which
takes Sharf’s critique of experience fully into account. This article is therefore a first attempt to
rehabilitate, or at least reprise<14>, ‘experience’ after Sharf.<15>
SHARF’S ARGUMENT
Those who are already familiar with Sharf’s ‘Experience’ essay may wish to skip the following
few sections, but since the essay in question is not available on the web, a review of the
argument may be useful, though it cannot supplant the eloquence or cogency of the original.
Moreover, my glosses on Sharf’s argument will reveal what I understand to be the main planks
in that argument; others may take a different view.
Sharf begins by observing that students (of religion) are very interested in mysticism because
most if not all think that religious, especially mystical, teachings are derived from religious
experiences. Sharf, however, criticises this naïve notion of the relation between ‘experience’
and ‘religion’. He argues that, emerging from the work of Friedrich Schleiermacher, William
James, Rudolf Otto and others who placed experience at the heart of their analysis of religion,
‘experience’ has come to play a pivotal role in the modern study of religions for two main
reasons. The first is that religious experience (seemingly) provides the empirical element which
makes religious phenomena religious.<16> Religious experience actually happens to human
beings in the world; it thus apparently confounds the sceptic’s or materialist’s claim that
religion relies on delusory beliefs about immaterial realms. The second reason is that
recognising a religious experience (across traditions) allowed liberal Western theologians to
acknowledge the value, if not the ultimate truth, of non-Christian religions.<17> For many
Western scholars of religion influenced by this liberal approach to religious plurality, concepts
such as ‘religious experience’, ‘the sacred’, ‘the holy’ etc. made comparative religion and
religious pluralism possible.
MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE: CORE OR CONSTRUCTED?
A dominant trend of thought in the twentieth century regarded mystical experience in terms of
a ‘core’ experience which was ultimately beyond words. Different cultural or religious factors
accounted for the many different peripheral expressions of the same core experience. (A
classic expression of this idea is found in Aldous Huxley’s The Perennial Philosophy). The
perennialist or ‘common core’ approach to mysticism remains extremely popular today.
Supported by ‘first hand’ accounts of mystical or religious experiences past and present, it
argues that mystics in different times and places are talking about essentially the same
spiritual consummation, and essentially the same method of achieving it, albeit under different
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names. Inconsistencies can be explained by cultural and linguistic variations or by the human
corruption of pristine teachings.<18> Opposition to this ‘common core’ view (and its variants;
for example that there are two, or more, ‘core’ types of mystical experience, or that mystical
experiences bear a family resemblance to each other even though not exactly identical) came
from constructivists such as Steven Katz, and latterly Grace Jantzen, who argued that we have
access only to texts, narratives and accounts, not to the experiences themselves. These
culture-specific narratives, moreover, do not reveal any ‘common core’. In fact, as the ‘core-
periphery’ theory itself suggests by relegating them to the periphery, they exhibit significant
differences. These differences are insignificant only for those who, for one reason or another,
cleave to the common core theory as a priori.<19>
From his constructivist perspective Katz argues that there is no reason to assume that a
‘mystical’ experience is unmediated. Nothing else that we experience is independent of our
context and conditioning, even dreams, which, like chemically induced states of mind, are
often used as a convenient analogue to mystical experiences. To ‘remember’ a dream is to
recount it to ourselves or others, in words used in this world. A dream which we cannot
remember at all is a non-event. For all practical purposes, Sharf points out (following Malcolm),
the dream is the remembering of it, not ‘the dream itself’.<20>
THE GENEALOGY OF ‘EXPERIENCE’
Sharf instead wants to examine the modern genealogy of the term ‘experience’. After
Schleiermacher, the appeal to personal experience became a primary resource for the defence
of religion against a secular/scientific critique which from the 19th century onwards threatened
to destroy religion as a system of knowledge. In modern times, Asian religions in particular
have been routinely represented as experience-based forms of spirituality; religions which are
experientially derived (and also therefore experientially verifiable).<21> Such and such a form
of religious teaching, it is said, is true not because it is revealed in a holy book or taught by an
authority figure but because it originates from an authoritative spiritual experience; a special
state of consciousness. However, today’s ‘hermeneutic of experience’, Sharf argues, has no
basis in real religious history. That is to say, Asian religions did not emphasise ‘experience’ - let
alone experience as the source of religious authority - before Westerners started saying that
they did. To substantiate this claim, Sharf draws on his own work on modern Asian meditation
traditions (South-East Asian Vipassana and Japanese Zen). Sharf points out that in Japan the
terms used for ‘experience’ (keiken or taiken) are both late nineteenth century neologisms
used to translate the imported English and German terms for experience. No indigenous
equivalent existed.<22>
Sharf writes of the situation today that:
“Contemporary accounts of Asian meditation typically presume that they are oriented towards
meditative experience … [yet] even when practiced, it is by no means obvious that traditional
forms of meditation were oriented toward the attainment of extraordinary ‘states of
consciousness’. Meditation was first and foremost a means of eliminating defilement,
accumulating merit and supernatural power, invoking apotropaic deities,<23> and so forth.
This is not to deny that religious practitioners had experiences in the course of their training,
just that such experiences were not considered the goal of practice, were not deemed
doctrinally authoritative, and did not serve as the reference points for their understanding of
the path.”<24>
Nowadays, observes Sharf, we find it hard to think what else Asian religions are about, if not
experience,<25> but this image of Asian religion is due entirely to the impact of a handful of
Western-educated or Western-influenced 19th-20th century ‘representatives’ of Asian religions
(Sharf names Radhakrishnan, Tagore and Suzuki). All were united in making the case that
Asian religion possessed the ‘spirituality’ and ‘experience of the sacred’ missing in Western
externalised religiosity. In other words, a few powerful Western-oriented Asian voices
promulgated a ‘reversed Orientalism’ in the service of Asian nationalism. Identifying religious
experience (whether Zen or Vedanta) as the wellspring of Asian culture implied ‘the apotheosis
of an entire people’.<26> Sharf speculates that this reversed Orientalism was an attempt to
balance Asian inferiority in modern scientific and technological knowledge and imperial
dominance, while Richard King looks at the issue from the other side, arguing that the Western
construction of the ‘mystic East’ facilitated a view of colonised peoples as world-denying,
amoral and lacking the impulse to improve society.<27> Either way, a few Western-oriented
Asian intellectuals writing in English certainly came to be regarded as authentic representatives
of Asian spirituality, with profound consequences for subsequent generations of scholarly and
popular interpreters of the East. There is no doubt that the initial curiosity of Western students
about Asian religions has often been piqued by the presentation of these religions as the
allegedly mystical, experience-based ‘other’ of Western credalism and externalised ritual.<28>
Subsequent comparisons of ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ thought, says Sharf, completely failed to
notice the tenuous ground on which the exchange had been built.<29>
WHAT IS EXPERIENCE?
Sharf then goes on to examine the idea of ‘experience’. The problem is that while experience
seems to be immediate and unmediated (and presumed pace Descartes to be immaterial), as
soon as we attach any content to it we objectify it and make it part of public discourse. An
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experience may be ineffable, but if it is, nothing further can be said of it. In the words of
Wittgenstein’s colleague Frank Ramsey, quoted by Sharf at the head of his ‘Buddhist
Modernisms’ article, ‘What we can’t say we can’t say, and we can’t whistle either’. (The shade
of Wittgenstein is felt strongly here, as throughout Sharf’s argument; ‘Whereof one cannot
speak, thereof one must be silent’.)<30> To know anything about an experience, even our own
experience, we have to know if it is for example ‘shamanic’, ‘mystical’, a feeling of
‘dependence’, ‘bliss’, ‘timelessness’, and so forth, and these are publicly shared concepts, not
inner experiences. To illustrate his point, Sharf refers to contemporary Vipassana meditation
traditions in SE Asia. Among different teachers, accounts of inner mystical or meditational
states conflict; the various accounts of what a meditator experiences constitute a contested set
of textual traditions, not a reflection of common inner states. The sequence and contents vary,
and more often than not the categories are in fact used to disparage competitor teachers – and
the same is true in Zen. Judgements about ‘experience’ (as well as appointments to
mastership, etc.) are actually made on the basis of public features such as authentic lineage,
behaviour and vocation. The authenticity of the master’s inner experience is in practice read off
from the manifest fact of their appointment as a master, not the other way round. ‘Experience’,
insofar as it has any content, is inevitably part of a hermeneutical circle.<31>
At this point, Sharf acknowledges, the vigilant reader will be objecting that surely ‘something’
must be going on? How can millennia of spiritual practice and mystical teachings not be based
on experiences? But the idea that narratives of ‘experience’ originate with those ‘experiences’
assumes that ‘mind’ is separate from ‘the world’ in some way (as the ‘mirror of nature’, etc.).
There is no evidence, says Sharf, that ‘inner’ mental (or spiritual) events point to anything
beyond themselves. It is here that Sharf introduces a test case which presents a real challenge
to the ‘authority of experience’ camp: the experience of alien abduction.
EXPERIENCE OF ALIEN ABDUCTION
Claims of abduction by alien extraterrestrials have been reported by thousands of ordinary
citizens in the USA in the twentieth century. The details vary but the essentials are similar
(rather like mystical experiences). The finer details of each abduction case are often revealed
through priest-like therapists and hypnotists who have made a specialism out of the treatment
of traumatised abductees.<32> However, Sharf reminds us, there is no corroborating evidence
to show that anyone has ever in fact been abducted by space beings. There is no ‘originary
event’<33>, only the experience. The experiencers are (in most cases) patently sincere about
what they have experienced, but their narrative is without question culturally generated; by
comics, TV programmes, films and popular literature about extraterrestrials including alien
abduction narratives.<34> Sharf’s follow-up question is obvious: why should we believe the
words of shamans, mystics and meditation masters any more than abductees? Authoritative
religious teachings, supported by authoritative religious institutions, constitute the widespread,
publicly mediated content of the truths perceived in religious or mystical experiences, in
exactly the same way that popular science fiction discourse, including abductees’ tales,
provides the content of the experience of having been abducted. Why should we believe in
either case that the reverse is true; that the experience proves the truth of the narrative?<35>
This seems to me a very good question indeed, though I do not share Sharf’s apparent
confidence that it is only a rhetorical question.
Sharf argues that as scholars of religion we are never presented with unmediated ‘inner’
experiences but always with culturally conditioned narratives, texts, rituals and performances.
Our knowledge about religion is not therefore knowledge about ‘inner’ experiences which
require to be interpreted, even if someone may state (as part of a public discourse) that it is.
WHAT’S AT STAKE?
Finally, Sharf asks, why is ‘experience’ so extraordinarily important to us today? It is because,
he says, “our last line of defence [of the personal life] has been the valorization of the
‘autonomous self’ construed as a unique and irreducible center of experience”.<36> To
abandon ‘experience’ (as a synonym for the inviolable inner world of one’s autonomous self)
might be to give ourselves up to reductionist accounts of self. Here, the modern notion of
selfhood and self-determination needs to be examined. As a rule, we want to accept the
irreducible selfhood of ‘others’ out of respect and sensitivity to others’ selfhood. Behind this, no
doubt, is the expectation that others will treat my own selfhood with equal respect. But when
others’ claims of experience contradict our own, we also want to reserve the right to look for
other explanations. For example, if in our view the facts do not fit, we want to be able to say
that an experience of alien abduction is just that: an experience, that it is not in fact an
instance of real (by which both we and the abductee mean physical) abduction by real, physical
aliens. Sharf draws the analogy with near-death experience narratives which are historically
formed;<37> they are not individual self-authenticating experiences of a separate ‘inner
psychological world’ separate from this one and accessible by phenomenological description.
Sharf therefore wants to criticise constructivism (as applied to mystical experience by Katz,
Jantzen et al.) as itself a wrong understanding of the relation between ‘inner’ mind and ‘outer’
world. Constructivists naïvely assume that since the historical and cultural factors giving rise to
the account of an inner experience are identical to those giving rise to the experience, the
account provides a ‘window to’ or ‘mirror of’ the experience. (For example, a constructivist will
on the one hand assert that Catholics have visions of the Virgin Mary because the Virgin Mary
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is a focus of Catholic belief, but on the other hand think of the visions as additional to the
beliefs on the basis of which the vision is constructed.) This, says Sharf is to assume that mind
is separate from world but can nevertheless be objectified; that is, be spoken of in the same
terms as the external world. For Sharf, there are not two parallel, mirrored or mutually
conjoined entities, one being inner wordless experience and the other outer public narrative.
Instead, there is only the public, shared narrative. This includes in modern times a public
narrative which dwells excessively (in Sharf’s view) upon the notion of private ‘inner’
experiences that are beyond words. This narrative about ineffable experience is historically
grounded in nineteenth century reversed Orientalism and, because it supports the Western
ideology of the autonomous self, it is now hegemonic to the extent that it appears to us self-
evident.
Sharf concludes that:
“The word ‘experience’, insofar as it refers to that which is given to us in the immediacy of
perception, signifies that which by definition is nonobjective, that which resists all signification.
In other words, the term experience cannot make ostensible something that exists in the
world. The salient characteristic of private experience that distinguishes it from ‘objective
reality’ is thus its unremitting indeterminacy. At the same time, the rhetoric of experience
tacitly posits a place where signification comes to an end, variously styled ‘mind’,
‘consciousness’ the ‘mirror of nature’ or what have you. The category experience is, in essence,
a mere placeholder that entails a substantive if indeterminate terminus for the relentless
deferral of meaning. And this is precisely what makes the term experience so amenable to
ideological appropriation. … All attempts to signify ‘inner experience’ are destined to remain
‘well-meaning squirms that get us nowhere’” (quoting Samuel Beckett).<38>
MAPS AND MYSTICISM
When in 1993 I wrote a short piece for a volume called ‘Mapping Invisible Worlds’ I did not
anticipate the critique Sharf would later offer of mystical experience, but I did pose the
problem of representing mystical experience as a signified or signifying entity. My argument
there, which compared mystical teachings to maps of a terrain, ran broadly as follows:
Ordinary maps are not prescriptive, or not intentionally so. For example, a road map may show
that all roads lead to Rome, but it also shows that all roads lead away from Rome; it does not
imply that one should go towards Rome rather than away from it.<39> By contrast, spiritual
maps (that is to say, narratives, teachings and parables which purport to teach some kind of
spiritual path)<40> insofar as they describe a path from A (our present state of separation,
suffering, powerlessness, ignorance, unenlightenment, etc.) to Z (the desired state of love,
bliss, nirvana, self-realisation, apotheosis, etc.), may appear as ordinary maps, but in fact they
prescribe a journey in only one direction; from A to Z.<41> Being prescriptive as to the
direction of travel, such maps inevitably describe the journey as it looks from A (here) and not
as it looks from Z (there). But implicit in this asymmetry of perspective is that the terrain will
be represented differently at each step. The act of following a map drawn from the standpoint
of A leads to a different view of the journey at each stage (B, C, etc.) which cannot be
represented on the map, since the map is drawn from the standpoint of A and the standpoint
will have changed.
This characteristic of mystical maps is illustrated by reference to the story of the gnat and the
wind in book three of the Mathnavi of Jallalu’ddin Rumi. The gnat appeals to Solomon for
justice against the Wind, whose strength oppresses him. Solomon agrees to hear the case but
only with both parties present. But as soon as the Wind arrives in court the gnat is blown away.
In other words, the gnat’s (the seeker’s) point of view is destined to be superseded by that of
the wind (God). Commenting on this parable Rumi says ‘Even such is the seeker of the court of
God; when God comes, the seeker is naughted’.<42> In other words, as we follow the map,
the map changes.
This principle is made explicit in the Mahayana Buddhist text The Lotus Sutra, in the well-
known parable of the Magic City.<43> A group of travellers is crossing a dense forest to reach
the Isle of Jewels, led by a guide. Realising that the travellers are weary and despondent, the
guide uses his powers to create an illusory city, much nearer than the real objective, as a place
of repose. Spurred to effort, the travellers reach the city (the lesser citadel of insular nirvana)
only to find that their real destination is farther on. Roger Corless says that such Mahayana
teachings deconstruct notions of ‘Buddha nature’ and similar cognomens of ‘experience’, which
suggests that “although Buddhism has … a good deal to say about ‘innate capacity’ and
‘mystical experience’ its ultimate goal is the deconstruction of these concepts and the
phenomena they imply”.<44> In much the same way, Rumi’s gnat is tempted by the prospect
of its day in court, only to lose its self to something greater.
According to Sharf’s critique of experience, such narrative ‘maps’, however self-subverting, are
nevertheless still public, historically and culturally conditioned narratives-in-the-world. They do
not signify, reflect or correspond to any ‘inner’ experiences we might think they describe. Try
as we might, it seems that we cannot make any meaningful one-to-one connection between
these spiritual maps and any unmediated inner mystical experience to which, ostensibly, they
refer. We seem to have reached an impasse. Nothing can be said about anything that is not
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already sayable, visible or (as Ramsey would say) whistleable; that is, capable of being publicly
represented. Meanwhile, nothing that is sayable transcends the cultural-linguistic context in
which it is said. Experience signifies only insofar as it forms part of culture, but experience that
forms part of culture is not unmediated, and is thus not an independent source of knowledge.
Can anything be salvaged for the study of religions (assuming we wish to salvage anything)
from Sharf’s provocative, interesting and persuasive critical deconstruction of the notion of
‘experience’ and in particular of mystical experience?
MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE OR MYSTICISM?
Accepting for the moment what Sharf says about the concept of mystical experience as a ‘well-
meaning squirm’, what can be said about mysticism? I think it is helpful at this point to
distinguish between on the one hand ‘mysticism’ as a teaching, and on the other hand the idea
of ‘mystical experience’. ‘Mysticism’is the teaching, the tradition-in-the-world, the narrative. It
may comprise many forms of communication including ritual practices, images, music,
buildings, sacred places, ritual calendars, and theologies. The study of mysticism in this sense
has no need to address the idea of ‘mystical experience’ unless the idea of such an experience
is explicitly enshrined in the tradition, and if Sharf is right to say that ‘experience’ was not the
goal of mystical religious traditions until we moderns identified it as such in the nineteenth
century, this means we need not include in our study of historical mysticisms any notion of
mystical experience at all. Clearing the ground of the clutter of ‘experience’ talk could well help
us to appreciate that when past mystics and religious teachers talked of the goal of religious
practice in terms of power, safety, love, detachment or purity they meant what they said.
‘Mystical experience’, by contrast, does figure prominently in modern public narratives about
mysticism, and as King points out in relation to the ‘privatisation’ and ‘psychologisation’ of
spirituality, it is now widely regarded as both the source and the goal of religious practice; the
inner reality ‘behind’ any mystical teachings, rituals, sounds or buildings. Indeed, as Sharf
insists, modern interest in mysticism tends to focus almost exclusively on the notion of ‘having
an experience’, to the exclusion of other factors. What this suggests is that when we look at
modern forms of mysticism we do have to factor in the role of ‘experience’, because the idea of
‘mystical experience’ is very likely to be enshrined in any modern mystical teaching.
At this point, it is useful to make a further distinction, this time between ‘speaking’ and
‘teaching’ religion. This is a distinction I examined at some length in relation to (a) being
religious, (b) teaching religion and (c) teaching about religion in the academy, in an essay
entitled ‘RAP, RFL and ROL: Language and Religion in Higher Education’.<45> In that paper, I
proposed an analogy between the speaking and teaching of a language (for example, English),
and the ‘speaking’ and ‘teaching’ of a religion (for example, Zoroastrianism). Without wishing
to push the analogy too far, I likened the ordinary adherent of a religious tradition to the casual
speaker of a language; fluent, no doubt, but in most cases unable and unqualified to teach the
language to someone who does not know it. In the same way, religious adherents may be
comfortable in their own religious standpoint, but without developing some special skills and
abilities they are hardly able to teach it to others. This is not because of any deficiency in
(respectively) language ability or religious devotion, it simply reflects the fact that teaching
others involves an art, a special capacity, which goes beyond the mere ability to state one’s
position or point of view. Religions, like schools and universities would be very different
institutions if they lacked teachers, though the role of teaching is often underrated. While
teaching of course presumes knowledge of content, beyond this it requires knowledge and
understanding of one’s audience; the ability to understand their language as well as one’s own,
so to say. Teaching involves far more than a simple speaking of one’s mind. The idea that what
we say is simply a one-to-one reflection of our inner thoughts and images is naïve, even in the
case of ‘ordinary’ speaking; how much more so in the case of the teaching of a mystical
tradition? If we don’t just say whatever we think, why should we expect a gifted teacher’s
words to be a simple expression of what he or she thinks?
It is important therefore to recognise that mysticism, by which is meant any specific mystical
tradition, is first and foremost a religious teaching. As such, it takes the form not of reports of
private experience but of a memory chain or authoritative tradition, <46> as Sharf would no
doubt agree.
THE SWAMI AND THE RORSCHACH
Two examples of modern writings about mysticism might help us here. The first is in a chapter
by Diane Jonte-Pace entitled ‘The Swami and the Rorschach: Spiritual Practice, Religious
Experience and Perception’<47> Jonte-Pace reviews studies of Rorschach inkblot tests applied
between 1950 and 1980 on an Indian Vedantic master (Swami Sivananda), some Apache
shamans and ‘pseudoshamans’ and a selection of advanced Buddhist Vipassana meditators.
The results demonstrated that these spiritual practitioners had incorporated their own
tradition’s teachings to an exceptional degree. They consistently discerned and articulated their
group’s teachings in the inkblot (in other words, they taught from the inkblot) and, perhaps
due to the meditative/spiritual training which had attuned them to the constant flux and
change of reality, they were comfortable with ‘vague’ and ‘slippery’ elements which in ordinary
subjects might indicate pathology (anxiety, depression, etc.).
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Jonte-Pace was unable to use her data to resolve the constructivist/decontextualist debate
about mystical experiences or meditative states. This is no more than we would expect from
our reading of Sharf, since there is nothing to debate beyond the public narratives. Jonte-
Pace’s cautious conclusion from analysis of the studies - she draws back from affirming, as
some of the original investigators did, that the Rorschach tests ‘confirm’ descriptions of
Buddhist meditative states - is that spiritual practices, as assessed by the Rorschach tests, lead
to ‘perceptual deautomatization’; that is, conscious awareness of processes which most of us
have automatised. “But” she says “we cannot finally determine whether the practice removes
cultural obstacles that previously obscured something hidden and innate. This dilemma
remains undecidable”. Jonte-Pace refers instead to Winnicott’s formulation of the infant’s first
encounter with the world as simultaneously a creation and discovery; “the infant creates what
is in fact … waiting to be found. …Yet the object must be found in order to be created.”<48>
Sharf would no doubt point out that this reciprocal creation and discovery, even in respect of
mystical experience, is a process entirely ‘in the world’ and if anything it reinforces the
argument that ‘inner experience’ is a concept, not a thing. What these tests do reveal however
is that articulate spiritual practitioners, if immersed in a particular mystical tradition,
persistently engage in teaching even while taking standardised psychological tests. Whereas
ordinary subjects might see a cloud, granny’s face or a map of Albania in the inkblot and be
disturbed by unresolvable shapes, these teachers see only their tradition’s teachings
manifested in the shapes before them. The strong implication is that teachers steeped in a
particular mystical tradition will automatically teach that tradition, regardless of the
circumstances.
THE POISONED SWEET METHOD
The second and rather different example is of the British-born writer and broadcaster John
Wren-Lewis. Narrowly escaping death after accepting a poisoned sweet from a would-be thief
on a bus in Thailand, the 60-year old Wren-Lewis awoke in hospital to find that permanent
‘God-consciousness’ had been thrust upon him. The state he woke up with he describes as
‘dazzling dark’. This state he differentiates from a Near Death Experience because (a) it had
none of the classic NDE features of tunnel, light etc, and (b) it stayed with him permanently.
<49>
He says “I simply entered – or rather was – a timeless, spaceless void which in some
indescribable way was total aliveness – an almost palpable blackness that was yet somehow
radiant. Trying to find words for it afterwards, I recalled the mysterious line of Henry Vaughan’s
poem The Night: ‘There is in God (some say) a deep but dazzling darkness’. He continues: “An
even more marked difference from the general run of near-death experiences however, was
that I had absolutely no sense of regret or loss in coming back from this joy-beyond-joy, this
peace past understanding, into physical life. In fact my experience as the hospital’s
ministrations restored the body’s vital signs was nothing like a return. It was more like an act
of creation whereby the timeless, spaceless dark budded out into manifestation, and what
manifested was simply not the same me-experiencing-the-world that I’d known before: it was
Everything that is, experiencing itself through the bodymind called John lying in a hospital bed.
And the experience was indescribably wonderful. I now know exactly why the Book of Genesis
says that God looked upon all that he had made, not just beautiful sunsets, but dreary hospital
rooms and traumatized sixty-year old bodies, and saw that it was very good. He goes on to say
that “the new consciousness has remained with me ever since”<50>
I have no doubt that Wren-Lewis is experiencing the world differently from me and differently
from his former self. However it is notable that he has little or no idea what to make of his
profound experience beyond describing it. He scours the mystical literature for information and
finds that much of it is ‘bunk’. For example, most systems say that attaining enlightenment is
very difficult and only for the few, while Wren-Lewis finds his God-consciousness
quintessentially ordinary. Yet he finds few who share his perception. The perspective that
Wren-Lewis articulates appears to correspond quite closely to a ‘cool unstructured’ type of
spiritual world-view<51> but Wren-Lewis insists that he is not himself a teacher: ‘I had an
overwhelming wish to pass on the awakening to others somehow, but had received no divine
commission to be a guru, and indeed hadn’t a clue what to suggest, since I could scarcely
recommend taking a potentially fatal dose of poison’. He finds affinity mainly with Krishnamurti
who taught that one needs no teacher.<52> Interestingly, Wren-Lewis had a long history of
religious inquiry (as a devout skeptic) before the life-transforming event in Thailand<53> and
simply by repeating his narrative publicly he has come to be regarded as a guru of sorts,
similar to Krishnamurti or to Andrew Cohen whose message can perhaps be summarised as
that there is nothing to learn, only wrong ideas to unlearn (and that spiritual teachers who
claim otherwise are misleading).<54> Wren-Lewis describes no path to enlightenment because
he believes there is none, and he posits no metaphysical ‘other’ (such as God) because in his
view there is nothing beyond the right here and right now, albeit seen differently from before.
Wren-Lewis is particularly hostile to teachings which outline structured spiritual paths and this
appears to be because he knows what he sees, not how to teach others. What makes Wren-
Lewis something of a celebrity in contemporary Western spiritual publishing circles is his
narration of an unusual, enduring ‘experience’ (i.e. an altered state of mind) which he
describes very positively and in terms which are part religious-mystical and part scientific.
Reports of such private experiences, as Sharf reminds us, carry immense significance for our
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modern culture<55> since they appear to confirm empirically the existence of that
‘autonomous self’ construed as ‘a unique and irreducible centre of experience; a self which is
constantly under attack from scientistic/ reductionist accounts of human Being.<56>
TEACHING AND TALKING
The fact that Wren-Lewis does not have a spiritual path to teach to others does not mean that
others don’t know how to teach, including at least some of those who underwent the Rorschach
test, and indeed many of the modern spiritual gurus and teachers whose spiritual paths Wren-
Lewis is keen to dismiss.<57> Thus, we can draw further distinctions between (a) mysticism as
an outward teaching or tradition, (b) ‘mystical experience’ as a signifier of an autonomous
inner self in contemporary discourse, (c) those who teach mysticism and (d) those who talk
about ‘mystical experience’. William James, Otto, Huxley, Katz, Jonte-Pace, Jantzen, King,
Sharf, and all the rest (including, in this article, me) are teachers only in the sense that we talk
about ‘mysticism’ and about ‘mystical experience’. We are not teachers of mysticism. Teachers
of mysticism also deal in words; they are ‘out there’ and as Sharf correctly observes, in
premodern times they were concerned with matters such as eliminating defilment,
accumulating merit, loving God, invoking apotropaic deities and acquiring supernatural powers.
<58> It is we in the modern world who are interested in ‘mystical experience’, even though
mystics generally say that such experiences are not a reliable source of knowledge, at least as
compared with teachings.
MAP READING
Failing to distinguish adequately between (a) discussing mystical experience and (b) teaching
mysticism is perhaps the hallmark of those who pursue MAP or Mysticism for Academic
Purposes. Wren-Lewis, so far as I can tell, is a ‘speaker’ of mystic perception. He is a
particularly articulate one, as befits a career writer and broadcaster. He cannot, however,
suggest any way for others to experience his ‘dazzling darkness’ and he explicitly denies that
he has a teaching. Other similar cases, such as the thousands of ordinary individuals who
report fleeting, unsolicited experiences to research bodies such as the Alister Hardy Centre;
<59> experiences which are then classified as ‘mystical’ or ‘religious’, again suggest speakers
of mystical experience, not teachers of mysticism. Just as most native speakers of English have
no idea how to teach the language to others because they cannot speak the other’s language
and have never studied applied linguistics, so, as ‘speakers’ of mystic perception, ordinary
religious experiencers have no inkling about how to bring about their perception in others.
This leaves the gurus, roshis, meditation masters and shamans; teachers often with long
experience of ‘incorporating’ a particular spiritual or mystical system who, as Sharf has shown,
often draw on competing, inconsistent and contradictory spiritual narratives. These teaching
narratives are ‘maps’ in which, as Sharf observes, we modern map-readers these days look
only or mainly for the non-verbal ‘experience’ we are so keen to discover. We seek such
sensations for the modern reasons Sharf has outlined, even though such experiences were
historically not present in mystical discourses which focused instead on protection, power, love,
detachment generosity, surrender, propitiation or knowledge. All mystical teachers, qua
teachers, operate some or other such taught system of mysticism, ostensibly designed to lead
us from A (no detachment, no love of God, etc.) to Z (liberation, love of God, etc.). The
academic study (as opposed to the following) of these systems is MAP; mysticism for academic
purposes. The naïve assumption that mystical teachings just mirror mystics’ inner experiences
is simply naïve MAP, as Sharf has shown.
Teachers, as teachers, do not just say what they think. (Even academics seldom do this.) An
effective teacher is one who addresses a particular pupil, taking into account the pupil’s
situation, what s/he wants and needs, and what will bring about effective learning. Something
that probably we all want is a map or narrative which shows us how to get from A (where we
think we are now) to Z (where we think we want to be in future). However, the very idea of
spiritual growth or development implies that the destination which attracts us from the
perspective of the starting point will bear little relationship to the real destination. Rumi’s gnat
dreams of his day of triumph in court, not of being blown away by God’s presence. Apophatic
traditions, both East and West, warn that words and concepts are necessary but should not be
clung to once they have outlived their usefulness.<60>
The Lotus Sutra, in its parable of the magic city, makes explicit this process by providing an
example of a ‘map’ which is at the same time a skilful and well-intentioned deception deployed
by a dedicated guide; a deception which therefore works. Mystical teachings comprise many
such maps, perhaps as many as there are guides, and if my analysis of the nature of spiritual
maps holds good, the implication is that the map will change as the traveller travels; as ‘where
I think I am now’ changes, so does ‘where I want to go to’. Competing maps (which appeal to
different audiences) and tussles over whose map is better (success in this contest reinforces
confidence in the authority of the map) would seem to be entirely consistent with the
audience-dependent pedagogical character of a spiritual map.
CONCLUSIONS
Returning to our initial problem, of what can be salvaged of ‘experience’ after Sharf, we may
make the following observations:
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The fact that ‘experience’ (and its translations in Japanese, etc.) is a neologism in mystical
contexts, that it has acquired a special value only in [post]modernity, does not render it
meaningless. In fact the reverse is true. Language, like everything else, including mysticism,
keeps up with the times. If, before the advent of modernity, meditation or spiritual practices (in
their many forms) were conceived primarily as a means to acquire purity or power, or to
submit to God, or to invoke apotropaic deities, this is because these objectives, in their cultural
context, were desirable and attractive. As Sharf shows, in modernity the notion of obtaining a
‘mystical experience’ has largely usurped these earlier goals, and this is undoubtedly because
in modernity we value above all the affirmation of an inviolable autonomous self, for all the
reasons Sharf outlines. This does not, however, mean that meditational practices which
previously were deemed to lead to purity, submission, love or protection now lead instead to
private mystical experiences, only that the publicly articulated and shared teachings
undergirding such spiritual practices have changed with the times. We seek ‘experience’ these
days because ‘experience’ signifies in our modern vocabulary a very significant, perhaps even
ultimate, religious goal, while ‘purity’ ‘detachment’ and ‘protection’ or even ‘escape from
rebirth’ may no longer appeal in the way that they once did.
The rise and rise of ‘experience’ as the sole empirical guarantor of the inviolable inner self in
modernity does not mean, either, that the self is in fact inviolable. Our (current) commonsense
conviction that we have a self which is (a) grounded in private experience and (b) constitutes
an autonomous agent, is persistently contradicted by the methodologies of the psychological,
neurological and social sciences, which typically see the idea of self as a cultural or
psychological variable; a construct. In fact, mystical traditions and traditional religions too have
often regarded the self as less important and substantial than it appears to the common
person. Mystical teachings often identify the sense of ‘I-ness’ as the self-perception of a limited
‘lower’ self; as ‘no-self’; as ‘mere’ ego, etc.. For a contemporary teacher of mysticism to proffer
‘experience’ as a religious goal could indicate a naïve, modernistic over-valorisation of ‘self’ by
that teacher, but it could equally reflect a skilful teacher’s understanding that, in the world-
view of modern disciples, the notion of ‘self’ occupies an exceedingly important, if precarious,
place, and an ‘experience’ of self is therefore an attractive proposition.
Either way, we might legitimately expect contemporary forms of mystical teaching to refer
positively and often to ‘experience’, simply because people these days think that is what
mysticism should be about. Experience, in short, has become our magic city. This does not
mean that seeking after ‘experience’ is somehow shallower than seeking after God, or that
seeking after experience leads to experience. A map, and a journey, have to start with where
we are. This of course begs some rather large questions, such as whether contemporary
mystical teachings which explicitly valorise the notion of ‘experience’ are as authentic and
reliable as mystical teachings in past contexts which did not, and whither, if followed, such
modern paths might lead, if not to the ‘mystical experience’ which these days, and from our
beginning perspective, we find so irresistible.
However, these are questions which cannot easily be answered by MAP; the academic study of
mysticisms. We are confined to the study of the different mystical systems; the mysticisms
available to us in the world as teaching narratives, without for a moment being able to
distinguish ‘good’ mystical maps and guides from ‘bad’ ones, except of course on the basis of
private judgement. This study can I think be quite adequately pursued on the basis of a
multidimensional model of religion attuned to modern concerns, such as that associated with
Smart’s phenomenology of religion, in which the dimension of ‘experience’ is acknowledged
where it occurs in the teaching, but is not given special priority over related elements within
the mystical tradition such as ‘ethics’, ‘symbols’, ‘doctrines’, ‘rituals’ or ‘myths’, etc..
===========================================================
NOTES
All internet sites referred to below were consulted on 8 August 2006.
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the BASR Annual Conference (Oxford) 2004, at
the XIXth IAHR Congress in Tokyo (2005) and in the SOAS Staff-Postgraduate Research
Seminar in London (2005). I am grateful to many colleagues for their comments; of course any
mistakes and misunderstandings remain my own.
<1> Robert H. Sharf ‘Experience’ in Mark Taylor (ed.) Critical Terms for Religious Studies.
Princeton, 1998, pp.94-116.
<2> This paper (like Sharf’s) is not about the definition of ‘religious’ or ‘mystical’, but examines
the widely-held assumption that a religious or mystical teaching can be understood as the
outward (verbal) expression of an inner (ineffable) experience.
<3> Sharf ‘Experience’ p.111
<4> Robert H. Sharf, ‘Buddhist Modernism and the Rhetoric of Meditative Experience’ Numen,
Vol. 42 (1995), pp.228-283.
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<5> The quip was Michael Pye’s. Probably the high point in theoretical studies of mysticism in
the postwar period was Stephen Katz (ed.) Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis (1987) which
challenged the foundational ‘common core’ or ‘perennial philosophy’ approaches found in
William James, Rudolf Otto and Aldous Huxley, though as Sharf points out, scholarly articles
which persist in regarding ‘mystical experience’ or ‘meditative experience’ as objective
referents continue to appear on a regular basis in respected journals (‘Experience’, p.103).
<6> For examples of each of these see: http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~gallaghr/paris2000.html ,




<7> See for example: on the Blessed Virgin Mary
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4468275.stm , on Chenrezig (Avalokiteshvara)
http://www.gadenrelief.org/chu-fast.html . All sorts of people see Elvis:
http://www.elvissightingbulletinboard.com/SightingLog.shtml .
<8> Richard King, ‘Mysticism and Spirituality’ in John R. Hinnells (ed) The Routledge
Companion to the Study of Religion, London: Routledge, 2005, pp.306-322.
<9> King, ‘Mysticism and Spirituality’ p.320.
<10> The current Wikipedia article on ‘mysticism’ provides the following routine definition of
mysticism, which rests on a repeated and unexamined notion of experience: “ Mysticism (‘to
conceal’) is the pursuit of communion with, or conscious awareness of ultimate reality, the
divine, spiritual truth, or God through direct, personal experience (intuition or insight) rather
than rational thought. Mystics speak of the existence of realities behind external perception or
intellectual apprehension that are central to being and directly accessible through personal
experience. They say that such experience is a genuine and important source of knowledge.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/mysticism
<11> Common responses are that Sharf discounts religious experience because he has not
had a religious experience himself, or that he is over-rationalistic. Sharf anticipates both these
objections in his chapter.
<12> Sharf ‘Experience’ p.110. The quotation is from Beckett’s novel ‘Malone Dies’, one of a
trilogy focusing appropriately on ‘the search for the self within the tragic realm of human
suffering’ (see http://www.britannica.com/nobel/micro/734_38.html ).
<13> The emerging field of cognitive studies or cognitive science of religion represents another
attempt to instate the study of religions as a ‘scientific’ discipline, unashamedly seeking the
‘causal mechanisms or processes underlying visible manifestations of religion’ (Jesper Sørensen
‘Religion in Mind: A review article of the cognitive science of religion’ in Numen, Vol. 52, No. 4,
2005, pp.465-494 (p.468)
<14> Dennis F. Kelley argues (in relation to Native American death customs) that continuity
should not be seen in terms of an authentic originary practice identified at a certain point in
history (by academic experts) which either continues (as tradition) or is disrupted (lost to
modernity). Instead, he argues, a community may ‘reprise’ its earlier traditions after a break,
just as in a piece of music a theme may be reprised, not in quite the same form as before, but
not different either. Denis F. Kelley ‘The Politics of Death and Burial in Native California’, in
Kathleen Garces-Foley (ed.) Death and Religion in a Changing World, Armonk, New York: M. F.
Sharpe, 2006, pp.3-22, esp. p.20.
<15> In doing so I am building on arguments about religion and religious teachings which I
have outlined in previous publications. The distinction between ‘teaching’ and ‘speaking’ in
respect of religion was first discussed in a paper called ‘RAP, RFL and ROL; Language and
Religion in Higher Education’ in Wiebe and Masefield (eds) Aspects of Religion: Essays in
Honour of Ninian Smart (New York: Peter Lang, 1994) while MAP (Mysticism for Academic
Purposes) was introduced in a brief paper entitled ‘‘If You Meet the Buddha on the Map: The
Notion of Mapping Spiritual Paths’ in Gavin Flood (ed.) Mapping Invisible Worlds. (Cosmos:
Journal of the Traditional Cosmology Society, Vol 9, 1993, Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1994,
pp.159-162. I anticipate that both papers will be available for reference on-line in the SOAS e-
print repository at http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/ (click ‘search’ and enter ‘Bocking’ in the author
search box).
<16> Experience, empirical, experiment, expert (and pirate) are etymologically related, from
Greek ‘per’ meaning trial, attempt, etc. See http://www.bartleby.com/61/roots/IE397.html
<17> Imposing the term ‘religion’ on a wide range of phenomena similarly made comparison
(and reification) possible, as Tim Fitzgerald has argued in 
The Ideology of Religious Studies, OUP, 1993 and (in this journal) ‘Religious Studies as Cultural
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Studies: A Philosophical and Anthropological Critique of the Concept of Religion’ (DISKUS Vol.3,
No.1 (1995) pp.35-47: http://web.uni-
marburg.de/religionswissenschaft/journal/diskus/fitzgerald.html .
<18> Human failing is often cited as the ‘common core’ explanation for contradictions in
religious teachings which originated with mystics. For example, the science and mysticism
writer Brian Hines argues that: ‘the same mystical truths have been known since the dawn of
recorded history … and can be discerned at the core of every major religion. Unfortunately,
these truths are easily forgotten or misinterpreted by those who lack the perfect mystic’s direct
knowledge of Ultimate Reality’ (God’s Whisper, Creation’s Thunder: Echoes of Ultimate Reality
in the New Physics. Brattleboro, Vt.:Threshold Books, 1995, p.92.
<19> Sharf ‘Experience’ p.97.
<20> Sharf ‘Experience’ p.113.
<21> Examples are legion. See for example promotional material for Transcendental
Meditation at http://www.mum.edu/tm ‘The Transcendental Meditation technique allows your
mind to settle inward beyond thought, to experience the source of thought — transcendental
consciousness. This is the most silent and peaceful level of consciousness — your innermost
Self.’ Or see the Elan Vital website at
http://thekeys.maharaji.net/downloads/DM_en/dm_en6.html .
<22> This point may be disputed on the grounds that it is not wrong to read the notion of
‘experience’ into older Asian religious terms, but Sharf would argue that we do this precisely
because we have bought into the view that Asian religions are centred on ‘experience’.
<23> i.e. deities who ward off evil (my note).
<24> Sharf ‘Experience’ p.99. The argument in relation to Buddhism is elaborated in Sharf’s
‘Buddhist Modernism and the Rhetoric of Meditative Experience’ referred to above.
<25> This may not of course be a view held by academic specialists versed in Asian religions,
but it undoubtedly helps attract students to our classes.
<26> Sharf ‘Experience’ p.101.
<27> King, 2005, p.320. William James’ data on spontaneous personal religious experiences in
the West of course challenged this stereotype, which might help to explain why The Varieties of
Religious Experience stood almost alone in its field until introspective ‘experience’ became
revalorised in the postcolonial period as the common ground linking mind-altering drugs,
meditation techniques, NDEs and past life regression, etc.
<28> We might point for example to the general lack of interest in Pure Land or Nichiren
Buddhism among Western scholars throughout most of the twentieth century, compared with
the plethora of works on Zen, which became the paradigmatic form of East Asian spirituality.
The reason is not hard to seek; Pure Land and Nichiren Buddhism were regarded as tediously
similar to Western Christianity and ‘prophetic’ religion, whereas Zen (according to the writings
of D T Suzuki) signified a spiritual experience thrilling beyond words.
<29> Sharf p.103
<30> These aphorisms by the early Wittgenstein (from the Tractatus) and by Ramsey are cited
together at http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/6s.htm#tran
<31> Sharf ‘Experience’ pp.105-7.
<32> See for example http://www.viewzone.com/abduct.html
<33> This is not to say that abductees have not experienced an event which is strange and
otherwise inexplicable to them, the most likely being a version of sleep paralysis, which is a
phenomenon interpreted differently in different cultures. However, the event is not actually
abduction, examination by aliens in a spacecraft etc..
<34> Again, one may question this confident assertion of fact over myth; after all, absence of
evidence is not evidence of absence. But the evidence (in millions of cases; up to 33 million in
the USA according to the website mentioned in the previous note) is wholly of remembered
experiences, or forgotten experiences ‘remembered’ through therapy; there is no independent
evidence that abductions have taken place.
<35> Sharf ‘Experience’ pp.108-110.
<36> Sharf ‘Experience’ p.111.
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<37> The reference is to Carol Zaleski’s Otherworld Journeys: Accounts of Near-Death
Experience in Mediaeval and Modern Times, Oxford: OUP, 1987, p.203. There is a New York
Times review at: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?
res=9B0DE6DC113BF934A35757C0A961948260
<38> Sharf ‘Experience’ pp.113-4.
<39> This is at one level of course a very naïve observation. Maps can be highly political
instruments, and many land maps include caveats about unconfirmed (i.e. disputed) borders
and names. All maps are projections, and inevitably emphasise or distort some features at the
expense of others; in this sense no map is a ‘neutral’ representation. However, once a map is
agreed to represent a given landscape using fixed conventions it is essentially neutral in what it
then represents. For example, the same map may be used equally well for the journey from
place A to place Z as from place Z to place A, if both places are represented on the same map.
We do not have space here to explore Borges’ telling fantasy of the map which was the same
size as the empire it represented (in his story ‘Of Exactitude in Science’ in A Universal History
of Infamy (Penguin, 1984).
<40> Spiritual maps may be visual images rather than narratives, for example, maps of the
biblical underworld http://members.citynet.net/morton/images/underworld.gif , tantric maps
showing chakras http://www.carla146.it/07documenti/colore/pagine/07chackra.htm , kabbala
diagrams http://web.axelero.hu/dob10638/konyvtar/x.htm , etc.
<41> In doing so, in order to account for the present unhappy plight of the soul, they may
also describe the ‘downward’ path from Z to A (i.e. how we fell into our present, unenlightened
state) but a religious or mystical map never prescribes travel in this direction.
<42> Reynold A Nicholson The Mathnavi of Jalalu’ddin Rumi, Cambridge: E J W Gibb Memorial
Trust, 1982 (1930), pp.258-60.
<43> Chapter 7 of The Lotus Sutra in which this parable occurs can be found at
http://www.sacred-texts.com/bud/lotus/lot07.htm
<44> Corless ‘Parables of Deconstruction in the Lotus Sutra’ in Robert Forman, ed., The Innate
Capacity: Mysticism, Psychology and Philosophy, Oxford: OUP, 1998, p.83.
<45> See note 15.
<46> The reference is to James Cox’s recent work on the methodology of religious studies, in
which he draws on the writings of the French sociologist, Danièle Hervieu-Léger. See for
example ‘Religion without God: Methodological Agnosticism and the Future of Religious Studies’
(Hibbert Lecture, 2003) at
http://www.thehibberttrust.org.uk/documents/hibbert_lecture_2003.pdf
<47> In Robert Forman (ed.) The Innate Capacity: Mysticism, Psychology and Philosophy,
Oxford: OUP, 1998, pp.137-159.
<48> Jonte-Pace ‘The Swami and the Rorschach’, p.157
<49> Accounts of this experience produced by Wren-Lewis are available on the web as well as
in print (see next note). For example http://www.geocities.com/jiji_muge/dazzdark.html .
<50> John Wren-Lewis ‘Lotus Feet of Clay: A Reluctant Mystic looks at Spiritual Movements’ in
David Lane (ed) Understanding Cults and Spiritual Movements. The Final Issue, Del Mar: Del
Mar Press, 1988, pp.1-6, (p.2).
<51> As developed by Andrew Rawlinson for The Book of Enlightened Masters Chicago: Open
Court, 1997, esp. chapter 3. In Rawlinson’s schema ‘hot’ refers to a world-view which sees the
source of divinity or enlightenment as outside the self (such as a God ‘up there’ or shakti
bestowed the guru, etc.) while ‘cool’ means an inherent enlightenment or realisation; godliness
as one’s spiritual birthright. ‘Structured’ means there are stages on the path to realisation
which can be taught systematically, ‘unstructured’ that there is no map of the terrain at all (as
in the case of Wren-Lewis).
<52> Wren-Lewis, ‘Lotus Feet of Clay’, p.3.
<53> There are different biographical accounts; that found at http://www.capacitie.org/
presents Wren-Lewis as an international scholar of religion and science. I have not been able to
locate the book entitled The 9.15 to Nirvana which Wren-Lewis has reportedly completed (see
Wren-Lewis section at http://www.capacitie.org/ ).
<54> Cohen now edits the magazine What is Enlightenment http://www.wie.org/ , a
publication which epitomises the ‘privatisation’ and psychologisation’ of spirituality identified by
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Richard King. In a recent issue Cohen writes that he has learned a great deal in the twenty
years since he started as a spiritual teacher (http://www.wie.org/j32/solid-ground.asp?ifr=hp-
art ).
<55> They are a staple of commercial New Age spirituality publications such as What is
Enlightenment, referred to above.
<56> This is not the place to debate ‘reductionism’, which can mean almost anything, but we
may note, for example, that Wren-Lewis, in a review of Susan Blackmore’s book Dying to Live
agrees entirely with her robust dismissal of the metaphysical claims made for Near Death
Experiences and takes issue only with a ‘depressive or down-putting feeling’ in her writing ‘that
for most readers cancels out her protestations of fully accepting the mystical message of NDE
reports’. http://www.capacitie.org/ > Wren-Lewis > Archive > ‘Dying to Live’.
<57> The argument in ‘Lotus Feet of Clay’ is that the ‘quintessential ordinariness’ of [Wren-
Lewis’] God-consciousness suggest to him that intensive ‘paths’ taught by gurus etc. are
completely unnecessary, and spiritual realisation cannot (contra Wilber) be compared with the
achievements of master-musicians, etc. (Wren-Lewis, ‘Lotus Feet of Clay’, p.3). Comparisons
with the utter ‘ordinariness’ of being able to speak one’s own language, contrasted with the
effort involved in teaching and learning a language one does not already know, might seem
particularly apposite here.
<58> Sharf ‘Experience’ p.99.
<59> For an overview of the Centre’s work see for example David Hay Religious Experience
Today: Studying the Facts, London, Mowbray, 1990.
<60> For an excellent comparative study of apophasis in Christianity and Buddhism see Janet
P. Williams, Denying Divinity: Apophasis in the Patristic Christian and Soto Zen Buddhist
Traditions, Oxford: OUP, 2000
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